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The Necessity and Effectiveness of 
Barriers to Foreign Direct Investment 
I. INTRODUCTION 
There are many people in the V nited States who fear that their 
country is at risk of losing its sovereignty.l Their fear is born out 
of an unprecedented increase in large direct and portfolio in-
vestments in the country. Foreign investment in the Vnited States 
has increased 315 percent since 1980.2 Investment from Japan, 
the prime V.S. trade competitor, has skyrocketed 706 percent 
since that same year.3 Foreigners owned $1.5 trillion in V.S. assets 
in 1986.4 Economists predict that Japanese investments alone will 
amount to $1 trillion in the Vnited States by 1995.5 This apparent 
trend of foreign ownership has instilled fear and resentment in 
many V.S. citizens. 
Foreign direct investment (FDI), in particular, is now a perva-
sive phenomenon in the V.S. economy and culture. Two hundred 
and fifty billion dollars of the $1.5 trillion of foreign owned assets 
in 1986 were direct investments.6 Foreigners own 75 percent of 
Waikiki Beach,7 10 percent of the V.S. manufacturing sector,8 
and 12.5 million acres of V.S. farmland. 9 Much of what most 
V.S. citizens consider to be "American" is actually foreign owned. 
I Sontag, On Japan's Behalf, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 19, 1988, at 38 [hereinafter Sontag]. 
2 [d. 
3 [d. 
4 Fierman, The Selling of America (cont'd), FORTUNE, May 23, 1988, at 54 [hereinafter 
Fierman (cont'd)]. 
5 Lambert & Howard, U.S. Real Estate: The Japanese Factor, Nov/Dec, PROB. & PROP. 29, 
32 (1987). 
6 [d. Foreign direct investment (FDI) is defined in the Code of Federal Regulations as 
ownership or control, directly or indirectly, by one foreign person of lO percent or more 
of the voting securities of an incorporated business enterprise or an equivalent interest 
in an unincorporated U.S. business enterprise, including a branch. 15 C.F.R. § 806.7(k) 
(1981). It also includes ownership interest in immovable assets such as real estate. [d. 
Portfolio investment is simply defined as any investment which is not direct investment. 
15 C.F.R. § 806.7(k) (1981). 
7 Lambert & Howard, supra note 5, at 31. 
8 Fierman (cont'd), supra note 4, at 55. 
g [d. at 56. Twelve and one half million acres is still less than one percent of the total 
farm acreage in the United States. [d. 
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Two aspects of this phenomenon must be considered before 
analyzing the law in this area. First, the cause of the increase in 
foreign investment generally must be understood. Secondly, the 
cause of the increase of foreign direct investment in particular 
ought to be determined. Understanding these two developments 
is necessary to provide a thoughtful analysis on the law regarding 
foreign investment regulation. 
The most significant policy question is whether foreign invest-
ment, particularly foreign direct investment, is beneficial or 
harmful to the United States. Most economists view the infusion 
of capital as beneficial to the economy, providing jobs, venture 
capital, new management techniques, and higher productivity.lO 
Some politicians fear, however, that foreign control will come 
with foreign money, and that foreign owners will not consider 
this country's best cultural and economic interests.11 Many U.S. 
citizens also fear that foreign speculation will bid real estate prices 
above the natives' ability to pay.12 Americans worry of possible 
U.S. dependency on foreign money, which could hamper do-
mestic policy decisionmaking. 13 Many U.S. citizens fear coloni-
zation or that the United States will suffer exploitation of re-
sources and technology with little received in return. 14 Lastly, 
some politicians fear that foreign control of industries will affect 
the national security interests of the United States. 15 Despite the 
volume of expressed concern and support, the consequences of 
FDI are still uncertain. 
To determine how the United States should regulate FDI, it is 
instructive to review the approaches other countries have taken. 
Countries such as Canada and Australia have long grappled with 
10 Koepp, For Sale America, TIME, Sept. 14, 1987, at 62. 
II Comment, A Proposal For Uniform Regulation of Foreign Investment in American Real 
Estate, 18 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 147, 151-52 [hereinafter Proposal for Uniform Regs]. See also 
Katz, The Legislative Response to Foreign Direct Investment in the United States and Canada, 2 
INT'L PROP. INV. J. 55, 56-62 (1984). 
12Id. 
13 Katz, supra note 11, at 62. 
14 Fierman, The Selling of America, FORTUNE, Dec. 22, 1987, at 54-56. See also Impact of 
Imports and Foreign Investment on National Security, Hearings on S. 285, S. 470, S. 694 and 
§ 171 of H.R. 3 Before the Finance Committee of the U.S. Senate, 100th Congo 1st Sess. 83 
(statement by Senator Lloyd Bentsen, Chairman of the Finance Committee) [hereinafter 
Finance Committee Hearings). Similar fears exist in Canada as well. Katz, supra note II, at 
62. 
15 Finance Committee Hearings, supra note 14, at 21 (statement by Senator Robert Byrd, 
Senate Majority Leader). "Our national security ultimately depends not only on defense 
preparedness, but also on our economic strength." 1d. 
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the dilemma of the costs and benefits of foreign direct invest-
ment. 16 Both countries have perceived FDI as a double-edged 
sword and have established review systems to screen the perni-
cious from the beneficial. 17 Some aspects of these review systems 
can be applied in the United States. 
This Comment first discusses the economic developments that 
have led to increased FDI in the United States. 18 Second, this 
Comment discusses the costs and benefits of FDI in the United 
States as well as in Canada and Australia. 19 Third, this Comment 
discusses the approaches of all three countries to regulating and 
reviewing FDJ.2° This Comment concludes that the Canadian 
approach best balances the benefits and costs of FDJ.21 Using the 
Canadian approach, U.S. policymakers could encourage FDI 
within the U.S. while preserving national control and identity in 
certain sectors of the economy. 22 
II. BACKGROUND: CAUSES OF FDI AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
INVESTMENT POLICIES 
A. United States 
1. Economic Developments in the United States 
a. Domestic and International Trends Which Have Led to In-
creased Foreign Investment in the United States 
There are several views that explain the cause of recent foreign 
investment in the United States. One view maintains that the 
nation's massive trade deficit has caused the sudden increase in 
foreign investment.23 According to this theory the United States 
is consuming more than it produces, creating a trade imbalance 
and borrowing money to pay for the difference.24 The country 
is, therefore, indebting itself so that it may consume more than 
16 See generally Ross & Cranston, Foreign Investment Restrictions: Defending Economic Sov-
ereignty in Canada and Australia, 14 HARV. INT'L L.J. 345 (1973). 
17Id. at 356-364. 
18 See infra notes 23-47. 
19 See infra notes 106-178. 
20 See infra notes 179-337. 
21 See infra Conclusion. 
22 Sec infra Conclusion. 
23 Fierman, supra note 14, at 45. 
24 DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, UNITED STATES TRADE: PERFORMANCE IN 1985 AND OUT-
LOOK 58-59 (1986) [hereinafter DOC REPORT]. 
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its income (or gross national product) can allow it to buy. The 
financing must come from abroad. Foreign investors finance this 
imbalance by making direct or portfolio acquisitions.25 Thus, the 
trade deficit creates a financial vacuum which has been filled by 
FDI. 
A new view of the causal relationship between the trade deficit 
and foreign investment differs from the conventional wisdom. 
The new view maintains that the trade deficit has actually been 
caused by an increase in capital inflows.26 A nation's imports 
generally increase when its gross national product (GNP) in-
creases. 27 Thus, the new view argues that the current import 
imbalance is, ih large part, a result of the economic growth in the 
United States throughout the 1980s.28 U.S. policies such as de-
regulation, tax reductions, and investment tax credits created an 
optimistic business environment which led to increased invest-
ment and thus to GNP growth.29 The GNP growth led to further 
investment which led in turn to more growth and to an increase 
in imports. Thus, capital inflows, enticed by the pro-business U.S. 
economic policies of the 1980s and the resulting economic 
growth, ultimately caused the trade deficit. 
Another view explains that the large government budget deficit 
has caused the recent influx of FDI. Increased U.S. government 
demand for financing attracted foreign capital into the United 
States. While private investors borrowed heavily to finance the 
economic growth, the U.S. government entered the capital mar-
kets as the largest debtor in the world.30 The tax cuts of the 1980s 
and the resulting deficit spending forced the U.S. government to 
borrow billions of dollars to pay its bills.31 The combined govern-
ment and private sector demand for loanable funds outstripped 
domestic supply of loanable funds (i.e., domestic savings).32 For-
eign investment made up the difference and the United States 
became a net debtor nation in 1985.33 Thus, while the U.S. gov-
25Id. See also Nasar, To The United States From The IMF: Shape UP!, FORTUNE, Dec. 22, 
1986. 
26 DOC REPORT, supra note 24, at 58-59. 
27Id. at 60. 
28Id. at 59. 
29Id. at 60. 
30 Id. at 57-58. 
3I Id. 
32Id. 
33 Id. at 58-59. 
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ernment's economic policies of the 1980s attracted foreign capital 
and increased GNP, the government's deficit spending further 
contributed to foreign capital inflows. Deficit spending and pri-
vate demand for loanable funds combined to outstrip savings-
the domestic supply of loanable funds. 
Finally, in addition to domestic economic forces, the interna-
tional environment encouraged investment in the United States 
over other nations. The large volume of borrowing during the 
1980s in the United States pushed domestic interest rates above 
rates in other nations, thereby attracting foreign capital.34 During 
the same decade Europe was suffering from economic stagnation, 
and the Southern Hemisphere was mired in the Third World 
debt crises.35 Meanwhile, foreign investors perceived the United 
States as politically and economically stable.36 The Japanese econ-
omy, with its very high savings rate, had huge capital surpluses.37 
These factors, combined with the apparent earning potential in 
the United States, spurred greater foreign investment in the 
United States than in other countries.38 
b. Investors' Choice in Favor of Direct Investment 
Foreigners have increasingly opted for making direct invest-
ments rather than portfolio investments.39 They perceive some 
direct investments to be simultaneously less risky and higher 
yielding than portfolio investments in the long run.40 The best 
example of this phenomenon is in real estate. Throughout the 
1980s, real property has consistently and prodigiously appreci-
ated in value, in contrast to the gyrations and crashes of the stock 
market.41 In addition, U.S. real property is very liquid due to 
advanced financial services facilitating real estate sales.42 Real 
S4 Id. at 58. 
55 Id. at 58-60. 
36 Lambert & Howard, supra note 5, at 30. See also Fierman, supra note 14, at 49. 
S7 Fierman, supra note 14, at 58. 
s8Id. 
S9 Koretz, The Buying of America: Should We Be Worried?, Bus. WK., May 9, 1988. See also 
Lambert & Howard, supra note 5, at 36. 
40 Koretz, supra note 39, at 36. 
41 Lambert & Howard, supra note 5, at 30. See also Fierman, supra note 14, at 50. 
42Id. 
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property is also seen as a safe inflation hedge since its value often 
appreciates at a rate that exceeds the inflation rate.43 
Direct ownership of U.S. companies also creates the opportu-
nity for long term profitability for the foreign investor. The U.S. 
economy is seen as a generator of new technology, and overseas 
investors have sought to develop and acquire new innovations for 
future as well as short term profits.44 The United States has 
abundant resources in human capita1.45 Its workforce is highly 
literate and skilled, and its educational institutions are constantly 
making new discoveries.46 In addition to these resources, the 
United States has a huge consumer base and the lowest corporate 
tax rate in the worldY Thus, FDI increased as a reflection of 
foreign investors' optimism for large returns from secure invest-
ments. 
2. Legal Developments in the United States 
a. Historical and Current State Restrictions 
Restrictions on FDI have existed for centuries. When national 
economies were largely agrarian, the only direct investment was 
real estate ownership. The English feudal system disfavored alien 
land ownership as a method of securing the loyalty of all subjects 
to the crown.48 The restrictions survived through the U.S. colonial 
period and were adopted in this country's legal system. Thus, 
aliens were ineligible either to purchase or to inherit land.49 Dur-
ing the westward expansion of U.S. settlers, however, many states 
encouraged expansionism by abolishing some restrictions on alien 
land ownership. 50 Although certain states eased restrictions for 
resident aliens, restrictions for nonresident aliens remained.51 
Some states stopped liberalizing land ownership rights in the 
late nineteenth century when many wealthy European investors 
43Id. 
44 Fierman, supra note 14, at 52. 
45 THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 1989731 (M. Hoffman ed. 1988). The 
literacy rate in the United States is 99 percent. Id. 
46 See id. 
47 Fierman, supra note 14, at 49. 
48 Comment, Alien Ownership of Kansas Farmland: Can It Be Prohibited?, 20 WASHBURN 
L.J. 514, 516 (1981) [hereinafter Alien Ownership]. 
49Id. 
50 I d. at 517. 
slId. 
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acquired large stakes of agriculturalland.52 Land restrictions still 
exist in all but sixteen states.53 In Minnesota, for example, "no 
natural person shall acquire directly or indirectly any interest in 
agricultural land unless he or she is a citizen of the United States 
or a permanent resident alien."54 A similar rule applies against 
foreign owned corporations.55 Missouri restricts nonresident al-
iens from acquiring agricultural land, broadly defined as a tract 
of more than five acres capable of supporting agricultural enter-
prise.56 Such land must be divested in two years or be subject to 
public saleY Many legal barriers against nonresident foreign 
ownership persist in the codes of several states as remnants of an 
economic order that existed centuries ago. 
These restrictions are largely ineffective for several reasons. 58 
The states have drafted these laws imprecisely, allowing foreign 
purchases through local dummy corporations. 59 State FDI restric-
tions do not prevent detrimental use of the land because they 
restrict land ownership rather than land use. Moreover, state laws 
are not uniform throughout the country. Some states, like Ken-
tucky, have not enforced these statutes for many years.60 State 
land ownership restrictions are, therefore, inherently flawed III 
their ability to stem foreign ownership. 
b. Recent Federal Legislation 
The federal government has only recently begun regulating 
FDI. The regulations, however, are very limited and largely cen-
ter on gathering information. Three main pieces of legislation 
52Id. 
53 POWELL ON PROPERTY, § 102.6-4 (1987). Land restrictions do not exist in Alabama, 
Colorado, Michigan, West Virginia, Delaware, Florida, Maine, Massachusetts, Missouri, 
Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Washington, and Vermont. Id. 
54 Forst, Regulation of Foreign Investment in United States Real Estate: State or Federal 
Prerogative?, 21 S. ILL. L.J. 51 (1981). 
55Id. 
56Id. at 52. 
57 Id. 
58 Comment, Our Land Is Your Land, 13 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 679, 697 (1980) [hereinafter 
Our Land]. 
59Id. at 682. See also Proposal for Uniform Regs supra note II, at 163. 
60 Fierman, supra note 14, at 52. For a thorough analysis of state land ownership 
restrictions, see Forst, supra note 54, at 21; Proposal for Uniform Regs, supra note II, at 
147; Alien Ownership, supra note 48, at 514; Comment, Foreign Investment in United States 
Real Estate: Federal and State Regulation, 12 CASE W. RES. INT'L L. REV. 231 (1980); Our 
Land, supra note 58, at 679. 
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have been passed by the U.S. Congress regarding FDI review: 
the International Investment Survey Act of 1976,61 the Agricul-
tural Foreign Investment Disclosure Act of 1978,62 and the For-
eign Investment in Real Property Tax Act of 1980.63 Recently, 
the U.S. Congress has provided a means for the federal govern-
ment to regulate FDI under the Omnibus Trade and Competi-
tiveness Act of 1988.64 
During the 1970s, the U.S. public feared OPEC's monopolistic 
oil power and its attendant ability to buy large quantities of U.S. 
assets.65 In response, Congress passed the International Invest-
ment Survey Act of 1976 (IISA).66 Congress' intent was limited, 
however, to gathering information on the nature and extent of 
foreign investment.67 The IISA presents no barriers to foreign 
investment except the paperwork requirements of filing infor-
mational reports with the Department of Commerce. These re-
ports must detail the companies' ownership, nationality, and 
amount planned to be invested.68 The IISA reporting require-
61 22 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3108. 
62 7 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3508. 
63 26 U.S.C. §§ 861, 872, 882, 897, 6039C, 6652. 
64 Pub. L. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (1988) [hereinafter OTCAj. 
65 Langley, The International Investment Suroey Act; The High Cost of Knowledge, 14 LAW & 
POL'y IN INT'L Bus. 481, 481 (1982). 
66 22 U.S.C. §§ 3101-08 (1976). 
67 Id. See also Langley, supra note 65, at 482. 
68 22 U.S.C. § 3103. The Act requires the President to "conduct a regular data collection 
program to secure current information on international capital flows and other infor-
mation related to international investment." Id. at § 3103(a)(1). The President must ensure 
that the information collecting system is efficient and adequate. Id. at § 3103(a)(3). A 
periodically published report must be produced containing the results and an analysis of 
the statistical information collected. Id. at § 3103(a)(4). The President is further required 
to conduct a "comprehensive, benchmark survey at least once every five years" of foreign 
direct investment and U.S. overseas direct investment after 1987 and 1989 respectively. 
Id. at § 3103(b). That survey will identify the location, nature, magnitude, and changes 
in total investment. Id. at § 3103(b)(I). It shall also obtain certain other business infor-
mation from individual enterprises such as balance sheets, income statements, and related 
information regarding trade between a parent and each of its affiliates. Id. at 
§ 3103(b)(2)(A)-(C). The survey shall collect employment data from each enterprise and 
will "determine, by industry and country, the total dollar amount of research and devel-
opment expenditures by each parent and affiliate, payments or other compensation for 
the transfer of technology between parents and their affiliates, and payments or other 
compensation received by parents or affiliates, from the transfer of other persons." Id. at 
§ 3103(b)(5). In addition, real estate was given a special level of scrutiny by the statutory 
requirement for the President to "conduct a study of the feasibility of establishing a system 
to monitor foreign direct investment in agricultural, rural and urban real property .... " 
Id. at § 3103(d)(2). This information was to be collected by the Department of Commerce's 
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ments seem to serve two purposes: 1) to allay public xenophobia, 
and 2) to gain important economic information regarding foreign 
investment in the V nited States. 
In 1978, Congress determined that the liSA had inadequate 
reporting provisions for foreign purchases of V.S. real estate.69 
In response, Congress passed the Agricultural Foreign Invest-
ment Disclosure Act (AFIDA).70 AFIDA requires foreign persons 
to report their holdings of any interest in agricultural properties 
to the Department of Agriculture (DOA) within ninety days of a 
transaction. 71 
(DOC) Bureau of Economic Analysis. U.S. affiliates of foreign parents were required to 
make periodic reports to the agency under the lISA. 15 C.F.R. § 806.3 (1977). 
The reporting requirements under the lISA were seen by some as an undue burden 
for U.S. affiliates and as an actual disincentive to foreign investors. Langley, supra note 
65, at 493. Anonymity is often desired for fear of political reprisals, either from one's 
own government or from the host population. Id. The paper work itself was also consid-
ered burdensome. Id. Another disincentive allegedly arose from the DOC's efforts to 
combat a loophole which allowed reporting to stop at the first foreign parent. The DOC 
amended its reporting regulations to prevent concealment of an actual owner by seeking 
the disclosure of the "ultimate beneficial owner" (UBO). Id. at 495. The UBO is defined 
as "that person, proceeding up the ownership chain beginning with and including the 
foreign parent, that is not more than 50 percent owned or controlled by another proxy." 
15 C.F.R. § 806.15(a)(6). Requiring the UBO to be revealed to the DOC was also consid-
ered overly burdensome because some intermediary owners were often unable to provide 
such information. Langley, supra note 65, at 497. With a $10,000,000 civil penalty and a 
criminal penalty of up to one year in jail, this was considered unfair and a serious deterrent 
to FDI. Id. at 502. Furthermore, whenever the secrecy of the UBO is in jeopardy, it was 
reasoned, many legitimate investors would also be deterred. Id. Such concerns have proven 
false since FDI has quadrupled from the period when those concerns were aired in 1983. 
See supra notes 2-9. 
69 Note, Disclosure of Foreign Direct Investment in United States Agricultural Property, 12 
VAND. J. OF TRANSNAT'L L. 665, 672 (1979). 
70 7 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3508. 
71 See 7 U.S.C. § 3501(a). AFIDA provides important definitions for its operative terms: 
1) Agricultural land is any land located in one or more states and used for agricultural, 
forestry, or timber production purposes, as determined by the Secretary under regulations 
to be prescribed by the Secretary. Id. at § 3508(1). 
2) Foreign person is any individual: 
i) who is not a citizen or national of the United States; 
ii) who is not a citizen of the Northern Mariana Islands or the Trust Territory of the 
Pacific Islands; or 
iii) who is not lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence, or 
paroled into the United States, under the Immigration and Nationality Act. Id. at 
§ 3508(3). 
The definition also covers any person, other than an individual or a government, which 
is created or organized under the laws of a foreign government or which has its principal 
place of business located outside of all the states. Id. It further includes persons organized 
under the laws of any state in which "significant interest" or "substantial control" is directly 
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Through the Foreign Investment in Real Property Tax Act of 
1980 (FIRPTA),72 Congress intended to eliminate the favorable 
tax treatment previously afforded to foreign investors in real 
property.73 FIRPTA places all income from the disposition of a 
U.S. real property interest under the taxing power of the federal 
government.74 Prior to FIRPTA, the United States only taxed 
foreign real estate owners when their real estate was "effectively 
connected" to a U.S. trade or business. Now, any income derived 
from the disposition of U.S. land is a source of income which 
satisfies the "effectively connected" criterion.75 Congress merely 
or indirectly held by any aforementioned person or individual. [d. Lastly, "foreign person" 
can also mean a foreign government. [d. 
The Code of Federal Regulations provides additional definitions: 
1) Any interest means all interest acquired, transferred, or held in agricultural lands 
by a foreign person, except: 
i) security interests; 
ii) leaseholds of less than ten years; 
iii) contingent future interests; 
iv) noncontingent future interests which do not become possessory upon the termination 
of the present possessory estate; 
v) surface or subsurface easements and rights of way used for a purpose unrelated to 
agricultural production; and 
vi) an interest solely in mineral rights. 7 C.F.R. § 781.2(C). 
2) Significant interest or. substantial control implies 10 percent or more of the corpo-
ration being held by foreign persons, even when no single individual owns 10 percent. 
[d. at § 781.2(k). 
The information gained from the reports filed by foreign persons is collated and 
analyzed by the DOA and reported yearly to the Congress and the President. [d. at § 3504. 
Reports are also sent to each state's department of agriculture or other appropriate state 
agency. [d. at § 3505. 
These reporting requirements seem to address some of the earlier problems inherent 
in the states' land ownership restriction laws. A foreign person must report his or her 
name, citizenship, type of interest in the land, and a legal description of the land. [d. at 
§ 3501. Still, the UBO need not be disclosed. Though reporting the first parent is not 
enough to satisfy the statute, a U.S. affiliate need only disclose the second and third tier 
of ownership. [d. at § 3501 and 44 Fed. Reg. 29030 (1979). Thus, foreigners can avoid 
ultimate disclosure by erecting extensive tiers. Such tactics can be combatted with § 3503 
which allows the Secretary to investigate persons reporting for accuracy. [d. at § 3503. 
Although the rule has been used sparingly, a corporate entity may be disregarded where 
its sole purpose is to avoid the effect of a statute. See Note, supra note 69, at 676. With 
this general rule and the watch dog provision of § 3503, the required extent of the 
reporting seems unclear. "The regulations suggest that the determination that a foreign 
person has invested in agricultural property may be sufficient for statistical purposes, 
without an inquiry into ultimate ownership, and do not address the question of sham 
corporations." [d. 
72 26 U.S.C. §§ 861, 872, 882, 897, 6039C, 6652 (1980). 
7S Proposal for Uniform Regs, supra note 11, at 155. 
74 [d. 
75 26 U.S.C. § 897(a)(l). See also Proposal for Uniform Regs, supra note 11, at 155. There 
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intended FIRPT A to balance the previous tax inequity and not 
to discourage foreign purchases of U.S. real estate. 
FDI became a significant phenomenon in the U.S. economy 
during the 1970s and throughout the 1980s. Yet, the United 
States failed to establish a uniform policy or a centralized review 
system for FDI. State regulation proved to be inadequate while 
federal involvement was limited to information gathering. The 
historical inadequacy of U.S. policy to FDI led to the recent 
adoption of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 
1988.76 
B. Canada 
In contrast to the United States, Canada has had high levels of 
FDI in its economy since World War II. In 1945, 43 percent of 
Canadian industry was foreign owned." By 1968,60 percent was 
foreign owned.78 Eighty percent of the foreign controlled enter-
prises were affiliates of U.S. based corporations.79 Thus, since 
1945 foreign interests have owned and controlled much of Can-
ada's economy. 
Prompted by anti-American sentiment, Canada enacted the 
Foreign Investment Review Act of 1973 (FIRA).80 The animosity 
resulted from the cumulative effect of foreign investment on the 
are significant reporting requirements to enforce the federal tax on land sales. Foreigners 
who own real property in the United States will likely be required to file information 
returns to the Department of the Treasury (DOT). Foreign investors must annually file 
an information return if they are "substantial" investors in a United States real property 
interest (USRPI). See I.R.C. §§ 6039C(b)(1), (b)(4)(B). A "substantial" investor is defined 
as an owner of a USRPI with a fair market value exceeding $50,000. I.R.C. 
§ 6039C(b)(4)(B)(i). The foreign investor is required to report its assets and other business 
information such as his or her name, address, and legal description of all USRPIs held 
during the year. I.R.C. § 6039C(c)(1). Like the lISA, such disclosure has created concern 
amongst those who believe confidentiality is an important inducement to FDI in the 
United States. Underberg & Teitelbaum, Foreign Ownership of Real Property in the u.S. in 
the 1980's, 1 INT'L PROP. INV. J. 39, 67 (1982). The introduction of a tax burden for 
foreigners investing in real estate has also created concern regarding its deterrent effect 
against capital inflows. Id. While theoretically justified, such concerns apparently have 
failed to materialize into reality as the volume and rate of foreign FDI has increased since 
1980. See supra notes 1-6. 
76 OTCA, supra note 64. See generally Finance Committee Hearings, supra note 14. 
77 Katz, supra note 11, at 59. 
78Id. 
79 Kreiss, Real Property Investment in Canada: The Foreign Investment Review Act, 1 INT'L 
REAL PROP. INV. J. 723, 725 (1983). 
80 Foreign Investment Review Act, 1973,21-22 Eliz., ch. 46 [hereinafter FIRA]. 
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Canadian economy, of which a majority originated from the 
United States.8! Canadian policymakers feared that economic de-
pendency on U.S. capital would result in political domination by 
the United States.82 The Canadians were particularly suspicious 
of FDI, which was seen as a tool for exploitation of Canadian 
natural resources and labor.83 FIRA answered the public's call to 
stem the tide of perceived U.S. domination. 
FIRA's investment regulation terms were stringent and com-
prehensive. Through FIRA, the Canadian government required 
any "non-eligible person" to ask for government approval before 
engaging in a transaction involving a Canadian business or en-
terprise.84 Investors were subject to denial if they did not provide 
a "significant benefit to Canada."85 
81 Kreiss, supra note 79, at 726. See also Katz, supra note 11, at 59. 
82 Katz, supra note 11, at 60. 
83Id. 
84 Id. FIRA defined "non-eligible person" as 1) a person who is neither a Canadian 
citizen, nor a landed immigrant, 2) any foreign government, 3) a nonresident Canadian 
citizen, 4) a landed immigrant who has been a resident for more than one year after the 
date he or she became eligible for Canadian citizenship, 5) corporations controlled by any 
of the previous people. See FIRA, supra note 80, at §§ 3(1)-3(2). 
85 FIRA, supra note 80, at § 9. See also Rose, The New Investment Canada Act, 20 INT'L 
LAW. 19,21 (1986). 
FIRA was mostly concerned about the control of businesses, which was defined as "any 
undertaking or enterprise carried on in anticipation of profit." FIRA, supra note 80, at 
§ 3(1). The mere ownership of real estate was not itself sufficient to be considered a 
business undertaking. FIRA, supra note 80, at § 3(9). There was some uncertainty as to 
whether land speculation transactions were reviewable. SPENCE & ROSENFELD, FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT REVIEW LAW IN CANADA 140 (1984). Investment in real estate, which con-
tained over 250,000 square feet or which was valued at over $10,000,000, was generally 
reviewable as a business enterprise. Id. at 150. 
To determine if an investment provided a significant benefit to Canada, FIRA gave the 
following factors for the Foreign Investment Review Agency to use in its review: 
(a) the effect of the acquisition or establishment on the level and nature of 
economic activity in Canada, including, without limiting the generality of the 
foregoing, the effect on employment, on resource processing, on the utilization 
of parts, components, and services produced in Canada, and on exports from 
Canada; 
(b) the degree and significance of participation by Canadians in the business 
enterprise or new business and in any industry or industries in Canada of which 
the business enterprise or new business forms or would form a part; 
(c) the effect of the acquisition or establishment on productivity, industrial 
efficiency, technological development, product innovation, and product variety 
in Canada; 
(d) the effect of the acquisition or establishment on competition within any 
industry or industries in Canada; and 
(e) the compatibility of the acquisition or establishment with national industrial 
and economic policies, taking into consideration industrial and economic policy 
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FIRA's stringent terms reflected the government's policy of 
increasing Canadian ownership and control of the economy. For-
eign ownership in the Canadian economy waned subsequent to 
FIRA's enactment.86 Foreign control in manufacturing, petro-
leum, and natural gas and mining industries fell from 65 percent 
in 1971 to 53 percent in 1978.87 United States control throughout 
this period fell from 51 percent to 41 percent. 88 FIRA effectively 
served to depress the level of FDI in the Canadian economy. 
Subsequent economic developments led to FIRA's repeal. In 
1982, the Canadian economy lapsed into recession, and the Lib-
eral Party suffered politically.89 FIRA was assailed as costly pro-
tectionist nationalism which deterred foreign investment.9o In 
1984, Brian Mulroney and the Progressive Conservative Party 
won the general election.91 The new government repealed FlRA 
through the enactment of the Investment Canada Act (ICA).92 
The emphasis of the ICA was on expansion of the Canadian 
economy rather than fear of foreign domination.93 Although 
Canada did not completely reverse its policy on foreign invest-
ment, FIRA became largely discredited. 
C. Australia 
Australia's historical experience with FDI largely reflects that 
of Canada. Australia's culture, economy, and political system are 
similar to Canada's. Australia is an English speaking Common-
wealth nation with a modern industrial economy. Its population 
of 16 million is relatively small given the geographical immensity 
of the country.94 Prior to the 1970s, Australia had few legal 
objectives enunciated by the government or legislature of any province likely to 
be significantly affected by the acquisition or establishment. 
FIRA, supra note 80, at § 2(2). These comprehensive factors reflected the government's 
policy to increase Canadian ownership and control of the domestic economy. 
86 Katz, supra note 11, at 77. 
87 Id. at 76. 
88Id. 
89 Rose, supra note 85, at 21. 
90Id. 
91Id. 
92 Investment Canada Act (1985) 33-34 Eliz., ch. 20 [hereinafter ICA). See infra notes 
223-245. 
93/d. See also Grover, The Investment Canada Act, 10 CANADIAN Bus. L.J. 475 (1985). 
94 Smiles, Wizards Needed in Oz, May EUROMONEY 86 (1987). 
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barriers to foreign direct investment.95 Massive capital inflows in 
the early 1970s, largely due to the undervalued Australian dollar, 
led to national concern over the foreign presence.96 Like Canada, 
Australia experienced the disturbing FDI side effects of foreign 
control and the imposition of foreign values, which often con-
flicted with the nation's culture and goals.97 Finally, public con-
cern over extensive foreign presence led to the adoption of a 
comprehensive FDI review statute. 
In 1972, the Australian parliament introduced certain mea-
sures to limit foreign takeovers of local businesses.98 Leaders 
sought to prevent takeovers that conflicted with "national inter-
ests."99 It was presumed to be in the "national interest" to prevent 
the foreign takeovers of an industry leading company.100 For 
companies that were not industry leaders, a proposed foreign 
takeover would still need to present foreseeable net benefits to 
Australia before approval. 101 These limited measures were the 
beginnings of national FDI review in Australia. 
By 1975, Australia responded to the increasing foreign pres-
ence and passed the Foreign Takeovers Act of 1975 (FTA).102 
The FTA grew out of the measures initially introduced in the 
early 1970s.103 The FTA set up a comprehensive bureaucracy, 
headed by the Treasurer, which reviews certain foreign acquisi-
tions to ensure that they do not offend the "national interest."104 
As of April 1989, the FTA is still effective in Australia. The 
95 Ross & Cranston, supra note 16, at 361. 
96Id. at 361. 
97Id. at 346. 
98Id. 




If this criterion is not satisfied, five other factors are considered: (a) whether, 
after the takeover, the firm concerned could be expected to follow practices 
consistent with Australia's interest in matters such as exports, imports, local 
processing of materials produced, research and development, industrial relations, 
including employee protection; (b) whether the takeover would have adverse 
effects on government objectives for defense, environmental protection, on re-
giunal development; (c) the extent of Australian participation in ownership and 
management that would remain after the takeover; (d) the interests of the 
shareholders of the company subject to the takeover; (e) and the attitude of the 
board of directors. 
102 Foreign Takeovers Act, No. 92 (Aug. 1975) [hereinafter FTA]. 
103 Flint, Legal Regulation of Foreign Investment in Australian Real Estate, 1 INT'L REAL 
PROP. INV. J. 615, 620 (1983). See also supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text. 
104 FTA, supra note 102, at §§ 18-29. 
1990] BARRIERS TO FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 181 
government, however, has supplemented the FTA with regula-
tions which often act to liberalize some aspects of the act. 105 
III. THE EFFECTS AND SIDE EFFECTS OF FOREIGN DIRECT 
INVESTMENT 
A. United States 
While most economists in the United States argue that FDI is 
an economic boon, some prominent politicians fear possible un-
wanted foreign influence and control. 106 Some policymakers fear 
a concerted mercantalist plot to insidiously invade and then de-
stroy U.S. industry.107 Potentially, foreign owners could monop-
olize a particular U.S. industry lO8 and charge exorbitant prices or 
otherwise disrupt the economy. 109 Many politicians believe that 
loss of national control of certain industries could threaten na-
tional security. I 10 
U.S. leaders also want to prevent the United States from be-
coming economically dependent on foreign investors. Overseas 
investors could trigger a U.S. recession. I I I An International Mon-
etary Fund (IMF) assessment predicts that when foreigners be-
come troubled by U.S. indebtedness, they will begin to dispose 
of their dollar denominated assets, causing the dollar's exchange 
105 See infra notes 264-76. 
106 Koepp, supra note 10, at 62. See also N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1988, at 34. In fact, it 
became a campaign issue during the 1988 presidential election. Democratic presidential 
nominee Michael Dukakis stumped, "Maybe the Republican ticket wants our children to 
work for foreign owners and pay rent to foreign owners and owe their future to foreign 
owners, but that's not the kind of future ... I ... want for America." ld. Ironically, he 
made that statement in a factory owned by IFI International S.A. of Luxembourg. ld. 
107 Finance Committee Hearings, supra note 14, at 22 (statement by Senator Robert Byrd, 
Senate Majority Leader). 
108 Koepp, supra note 10, at 60. 
1091d. 
110 Finance Committee Hearings, supra note 14, at 80-81. At the Finance Committee's 
national security hearing, Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldrige stated, "I can only 
conclude that the common objective of the Japanese government and industry is to 
dominate the world electronics market. Given the importance of this market to U.S. 
industry in general and our defense base in particular, we cannot idly stand by." ld. at 42 
(statement by Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldrige). Senate Majority Leader Robert 
Byrd agreed that, "Our national security ultimately depends not only on defense pre-
paredness, but also on our economic strength." ld. at 21 (statement by Senate Majority 
Leader Robert Byrd). Many policymakers fear that foreign land ownership poses a threat 
to national security and sovereignty through its effect on agriculture and the food supply. 
See Proposal for Uniform Regs, supra note II, at 151-153. See also infra note 220. 
III Nasar, supra note 25, at 3. 
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rate to fall. l12 Interest rates would then rise dramatically in an 
effort to maintain foreign investment levels. ll3 Such movement 
would send the economy into recession. 114 In this way, foreign 
investors already indirectly dictate domestic priorities.ll5 The 
housing market, for example, is deeply affected by domestic in-
terest rates. Any increase in interest rates to appease foreign 
capitalists could depress the domestic housing industry.1I6 
National dependence on foreign money can seriously limit U.S. 
policymakers' range of options. Domestic priorities may lose their 
importance relative to maintaining FDI levels. ll7 For example, 
plans to expand the money supply either to boost aggregate 
consumer demand or to increase investment may need to be 
forgone so as to keep interest rates attractive to foreign investors. 
U.S. leaders already find it difficult to review investments that 
affect national security. lIB National security decisions could even 
be inhibited by threatened foreign investor disapproval. The Rea-
gan Administration learned this when it blocked Fujitsu from 
purchasing Fairchild, a microchip company, on national security 
grounds. 119 Foreign investors reacted by cutting their dollar hold-
ings, which caused a brief increase in interest rates. 120 These are 
just two examples of how foreign investor reaction can restrict 
the U.S. government's policy options. 
Some skeptics also argue that FDI actually decreases U.S. em-
ployment opportunities. The United Auto Workers (UAW) con-
tends that foreign auto assembly plants in the United States elim-
inate three jobs for everyone they create. l2l U.S. citizens thereby 
lose jobs because foreign owned plants import many of their 







118 Koretz, supra note 39, at 36. "As long as the U.S. is dependent on foreign capital, 
trying to control the portfolio decisions of overseas dollar holders is both unreasonable 
and risky." [d. 
119 Koepp, supra note 10, at 60-62. 
120 !d. 
121 [d. 
122 [d. Foreign ownership of U.S. business has sometimes affected job satisfaction. Six 
top level executives resigned from Lor Geller Federico and Einstein, a New York ad 
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Foreign investment has resulted in some transfer of U.S. tech-
nology overseas. 123 Foreign investors can use the new technology 
they develop in the United States against U.S. firms.124 This sets 
U.S. firms at a deeper competitive disadvantage. 125 Eventually 
this technology transfer could displace more U.S. workers. 126 Fur-
thermore, the technology transfer will likely lead to further re-
search in the foreign nation. This, in theory, results in a transfer 
of educational and production capabilities to foreign trade com-
petitors. 127 
The farm states are particularly concerned about foreign own-
ership of agricultural land. Although foreigners own only about 
1 percent of the U.S. farm acreage, there are persistent fears that 
such land could be shut down, sold off, or developed thereby 
decreasing productive capabilities. 128 Local leaders also fear that 
absentee ownership dilutes the sense of local community and 
decreases civic involvement and responsibility toward the com-
munity.129 Nonresident aliens bid up the price of land beyond 
the local residents' ability to buy, causing a malaise in communities 
where long time residents can no longer afford to live in the land 
of their ancestors. 130 
While pessimists in the United States insist that the economic 
glass is half empty, optimists point out that the United States 
realizes substantial benefits from foreign direct investment. The 
most obvious benefit is jobs. Foreign companies directly employ 
about 3,000,000 U.S. citizens or around 3 percent of the work 
agency, because they were reportedly tired of working like "indentured servants to British 
masters." Fierman (cont'd), supra note 4, at 56. In addition, foreign management often 
brings disturbing foreign practices. Japanese multinational corporations regularly favor 
Japanese over non-Japanese in placement of upper level management. Fallows, Containing 
Japan, ATLANTIC, May, 1989, at 54. Many are known for treating women employees 
poorly and for consistently not hiring minorities. Powell, et aI., The Asian Challenge, 
NEWSWEEK, Oct. 9, 1989, at 72. 
123 Fierman (cont'd), supra note 4, at 60. See also Powell, et aI., supra note 122, at 69. 
Mere dependence on foreign high tech imports tends to atrophy domestic ability to 
develop the technology required to produce such products domestically. [d. 




128 Proposal for Uniform Regs, supra note 11, at 151-153. 
129 [d. 
130 [d. at 152. 
184 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XIII, No.1 
force. 131 This injection of income begins an economic multiplier 
effect which increases the demand for other goods and services, 
thereby creating further employment. 132 
Foreign investors are also an important source of funding for 
research and development. 133 Foreign capital financed one quar-
ter of the $2.3 billion spent on venture capital enterprises. 134 
Thus, many research and development projects would not have 
continued but for foreign involvement. 135 Such money effectively 
helps finance the U.S. leadership role in technology, an area 
where U.S. investors are reluctant to risk investment. 136 
Foreign direct investment has also introduced new corporate 
management techniques. These new techniques have increased 
productivity and have improved the quality of U.S. production. 137 
For example, Japanese owned companies in the United States 
have a production defect rate six to ten times lower than com-
panies owned by U.S. citizens. 138 
Lastly, optimists believe that the nationality of the owner of an 
enterprise or piece of real estate is of no import. 139 Investors seek 
self-gratification through profits. l4O They are not necessarily 
agents for a particular nation's strategy to dominate the world. l41 
Thus, a French investor will act no differently from a Japanese 
investor or an American investor. Decisions in a capitalist market 
are simply based on individual profitability.142 
B. Canada 
The Canadian experience illustrates the long-term effects of 
pervasive FDI in a national economy. Canadian leaders have long 
debated the trade-off between economic growth through foreign 






137 !d. at 54. 
'38Id. 
139 Interview with Carlos De Borbon, Prince of Spain, Economist, in Boston (Sept. 30, 
1988). See also Koepp, supra note 10, at 56 (quoting Governor John Waihee of Hawaii, 
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investment and nationalist gratification through local control. 143 
They have recently reached a compromise under the Investment 
Canada Act. 
Canada has received the same sort of benefits from FDI as has 
the V nited States. Such investment brings jobs and a higher 
standard of living to the local population. But the negative aspect 
of FDI has been particularly visible in Canada. 
In the early 1970s, Canadians began to resent the pervasive 
presence of V.S. multinational corporations (MNCs) in their 
economy. They feared that economic dependence on the Vnited 
States would result in political domination and loss of their na-
tional identity.144 Canadian leaders believed that their ability to 
formulate economic policy was hampered by the MNCs.145 Since 
MNCs' interests are worldwide, their own profitability interests 
were not necessarily aligned with Canadian interests and were 
often contrary to those of their Canadian subsidiaries. 146 Thus, 
Canadian interests were often disregarded by MNCs in search of 
global profit. 147 For example, foreign MNCs' division of labor 
often relegated Canadians to low level management by keeping 
important business decision making power outside of Canada. 148 
This phenomenon disadvantaged Canada in its dealings with the 
rest of the world. 149 
Canadians also became concerned about a loss of political au-
tonomy.150 V.S. policy deeply affected the Canadian economy and 
belittled the significance of local policymakers. 151 V.S. MNCs 
would obey V.S. law in defiance of Canadian economic or foreign 
policy. For example, V.S. owned Canadian affiliates would not 
trade with communist countries. 152 V.S. policies were often ad-
vanced at the expense of Canadian industry.153 
Lastly, Canadians feared V.S. colonization. 154 Specifically, they 
objected to Canada's symbiotic relationship with the Vnited 
143 See supra notes 80-94. 
144 Kreiss, supra note 79, at 726. 





150/d. at 61. 
151Id. 
152Id. at 62. 
153Id. 
154Id. 
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States. 155 Canada's resources were exported to the United States, 
manufactured, and later returned as finished products. 156 This 
led to Canadian resentment of the perceived U.S. neo-imperial-
ism. Canadian animosity toward U.S. investment presence led to 
the passage of the Foreign Investment Review Act. 157 
FIRA restricted foreign ownership in the Canadian economy 
at the expense of economic growth. The recession of 1982 led to 
a liberalization of the FDI policy established under FIRA.158 The 
change created jobs and an economic recovery.159 As FDI in-
creased through the 1980s, Canada's economy expanded. 160 
C. Australia 
The concerns in Australia regarding foreign investment mirror 
those in the United States and Canada. Australians have ex-
pressed concern over their growing dependency on foreign in-
vestment for domestic economic growth. 161 Japanese funds un-
derpin the Australian securities market. 162 Japanese money is also 
needed to develop service properties which are crucial for Aus-
tralia's vitally important tourist industry.163 Approximately 45 
percent of Australia's mining industry and 32.9 percent of its 
manufacturing is foreign owned and controlled. 164 Foreign own-
ership of important sectors of the economy removes economic 
power from the local people. 165 The economy begins to produce 
goods that conform to foreign tastes and values. 166 
Like the United States, Australia is concerned with foreign 
ownership of land. Investors from Japan and Hong Kong have 
155 [d. 
156 [d. 
157 Kreiss, supra note 79, at 726. 
158 See supra notes 92-93. 
159 2 INVESTING IN CANADA 2 (1988). Canada's economy is the fastest growing of the 
"big seven" market economies. The "big seven" are commonly thought to consist of the 
United States, Canada, Japan, Great Britain, West Germany, France, and Italy. 
160 [d. Economist Alan Ruyman of the C.D. Howe Institute remarked about the level 
of FDI in the Canadian economy, "We in Canada have much more foreign ownership 
than tht' United States will ever have, and we're one of the wealthiest countries in the 
world as a result." Koepp, supra note 10, at 62. 
161 Spur, Australia Goes Asian, N.V. Times, Dec. 4, 1988, (Magazine), at 48. 
162Id. 
163 [d. 
164 Foreign Investment Review Board Report 1986-87, Table 3.5 [hereinafter FIRB 
Report]. 
165 Spur, supra note 161, at 46. 
166 [d. 
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entered the urban real estate markets with greater buying power 
than the local population. 167 Prices have sharply risen to meet the 
new demand. 168 Homeowners who hear about wholesale subur-
ban sell-offs are afraid of becoming tenants in their own coun-
try.169 Australians also feel threatened at the sudden Japanese 
ownership of 70 percent of the prime resort development in 
Queensland. 170 Despite the resentment, much of the foreign real 
estate investment is productive. l7l Japanese investment finances 
the Australian tourist industry and provides an ~nfrastructure 
"which Australians themselves do not take the risks to provide."172 
Though these investments provide jobs and income for many 
Australians, many other real estate investments have bid Austra-
lians out of their own land. 173 Australian real estate clearly pre-
sents both the advantages and disadvantages of foreign direct 
investment. 
Perhaps the largest cost for a host country receiving foreign 
investment is simply damage to the public's sense of nationalistic 
pride. For example, the Japanese have born the brunt of Austra-
lian nationalistic resentment, largely as a result of lingering ill-
feeling over World War 11.174 There have been public demon-
strations protesting Japanese ownership and the resulting om-
nipresence of Japanese culture in Australia. 175 The opposition 
Liberal-National Party is fearful of foreign investment and its 
counterpart, immigration. 176 It has called upon the Australian 
government to protect Australia's national identity and its "Judeo-
Christian ethic."177 Thus, a cost of foreign investment is the threat 
of malaise in the local population or a national feeling of emas-
culation in the wake of a dominating foreign presence. 178 A com-
pelling problem for policymakers in any country in response to 





172Id. at 49. 
173Id. at 46. 
174 Id. at 48. Nancy Wake, a popular figure and Australian heroine of the French 
Resistance, has implored her countrymen not to "accept money from a nasty little enemy." 
(i.e., the Japanese). Id. 
175Id. 
176Id. at 52. 
177 Id. at 59. 
178Id. at 52. 
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such public ill-feeling is determining how to calculate the value 
of national pride. 
IV. CURRENT LAW 
A. United States: The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act 
In 1988, Congress passed the Omnibus Trade and Competi-
tiveness Act (OTCA).179 Unlike the federal statutes previously 
mentioned, OTCA provides the chief executive with authority to 
review and, if necessary, deny any applications for foreign in-
vestment or ownership in the economy.180 
The threshold for review under OTCA is low. Any foreign 
investment which amounts to a merger, acquisition, or takeover 
of a corporate entity is reviewable. 181 The corporate entity sought 
to be acquired must also be engaged in interstate commerce. 182 
The criteria for denying foreign investment applications are 
limited. The President may deny an application only when there 
is "credible evidence" that foreign ownership would threaten to 
impair "national security."183 The President's discretion is not 
subject to review,I84 
OTCA provides three factors to help the President determine 
if an acquisition may threaten national security. The President 
may consider the domestic production requirements for national 
defense,185 the capability and capacity of domestic industries to 
meet national defense production requirements,186 and the effect 
of foreign ownership on the nation's ability to meet its national 
security needs. 187 These factors are neither mandatory nor exclu-
sive. 188 Rather, they "may" be considered among other factors 
not mentioned in OTCA.189 
179 OTCA, supra note 64. 
180 [d. at § 5021, Amending the Defense Production Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. App. 
§§ 2061-2170. This provision is commonly referred to as the Exon-Florio Amendment 
and is codified as 50 U.S.C. App. § 2170. 
181 50 U.S.c. App. § 2170. 
182 [d. 
183 [d. at § 2170(d)(I)-(2). 
184 [d. 
185 [d. at § 2170(e)(l). 
186 [d. at § 2170(e)(2). 
187 [d. at § 2170(e)(3). 
188 [d. at § 2170. 
189 [d. 
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Although the OTCA provision that grants the review and reject 
power over FDI is relatively small,190 the executive branch seems 
to have received broad new powers. Though the review is limited 
to the realm of national security, the President's decision cannot 
be challenged in court. 191 Furthermore, the national security cri-
terion is an ambiguous limitation. The term can be broadly in-
terpreted so as to permit review of anything affecting U.S. eco-
nomic health. Such an interpretation would defy the common 
usage of the term as applying to areas of national defense. The 
legislative intent is unclear, however, because the statutory context 
of the Act seems to conflict with the provision's legislative history. 
The three factors provided in the OTCA review and reject 
provision vaguely define national security. 192 The first two factors 
specifically refer to private industry's capacity to meet U.S. de-
fense requirements. 193 But the third factor mentions an appar-
ently separate concern of ensuring private industry's ability to 
meet this nation's national security needs. 194 If the meaning of 
national security was limited to that of defense, there would be 
no need to list the third factor because it would be redundant. 
Some insight into the proper scope of national security may be 
gained by reviewing the Defense Production Act of 1950 (DPA), 
which was amended by OTCA. Congress passed the DPA during 
the height of the Cold War as a military readiness, defense mo-
bilization act. 195 Its purpose was to promote national defense by 
managing the economy in such a way as to meet national security 





194 [d. at § 2170(e)(1)-(3). 
195 50 U.S.c. App. §§ 2061, 2062 (1950). 
196 50 U.S.c. App. § 2062. Congress passed the DPA to oppose "acts of aggression and 
to promote peace." [d. at § 2061. To that end, the DPA sought to "develop and maintain 
whatever military and economic strength is found to be necessary .... " [d. The more 
precise objective of the DPA was to provide the President with authority to divert "certain 
materials and facilities from civilian use to military and related purposes." [d. The DPA 
requires "expansion of productive facilities beyond the levels needed to meet civilian 
demand." [d. The President, pursuant to the DPA, is to use his powers "to promote 
national defense, by meeting promptly and effectively, the requirements of military pro-
grams in support of national security and foreign policy objectives; and by preventing 
undue strains and dislocations upon wages, prices, and production or distribution of 
materials for civilian use .... " [d. The statute's declaration of policy was amended in 
1953 by stating the congressional intent more precisely. [d. (as amended). The amended 
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Though the effects of the DPA were broad, it closely identified 
its purpose of national defense with the military. National defense 
was statutorily defined as follows: 
the operations and activities of the armed forces, the Atomic 
Energy Commission, or any other government department 
or agency directly or indirectly and substantially concerned 
with the national defense, or operations or activities in con-
nection with the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949. 197 
National defense was later redefined by an amendment to the 
DPA in 1953. 198 The term was limited to "programs for military 
and atomic energy production or construction, military assistance 
to any foreign nation, stockpiling, space, and directly related 
activity." 199 
The DPA focuses on the capability of the nation to sustain a 
forceful defense. Since OTCA amends the DPA, OTCA's pur-
poses ought to be read consistently with the purpose of the DPA. 
Therefore, concerns of national security should not be read to 
be any broader than the DPA's purposes. The President's national 
security review for foreign takeovers seems to cover only busi-
nesses "directly related" to U.S. military defense.2oo 
provision focuses on the need to bolster "mobilization efforts" so as to prepare the United 
States for a possible "attack." [d. The provision no longer mentions any policy regarding 
price and wage stabilization. [d. 
197 [d. at § 2152(d). 
198 [d. 
199 [d. 
200 The Joint Conferees stated that the power granted to the president to block mergers, 
acquisitions, and takeovers of companies "essential to the defense industrial base" under 
the DPA is unaffected by OTCA. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 576, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. at 
926 [hereinafter CONFERENCE REPORT]. 
Pursuant to the OTCA amendment to the Defense Production Act (see supra notes 180, 
181), the Department of the Treasury proposed regulations governing the administration 
of foreign investment review. 31 C.F.R. 800.101-702 (1989) (Regulations). Though the 
Regulations define several terms, no definition is given for "national security." [d. at 
800.201-221. 
According to the proposed Regulations, the actual review process begins when the 
Treasury's Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (Committee) receives 
notice of a proposed merger or acquisition. [d. at 800.401. Effective notice may either be 
made by one of the parties in the proposed transaction (voluntary notice) or by one of 
the members of the Committee (agency notice). No other communication can begin the 
review process. [d. 
The Committee must determine whether the proposed investment warrants a "national 
security" investigation within thirty days of receiving notice. [d. at 800.403. The Committee 
must then complete its investigation within forty-five days. [d. at 800.504. Thereafter, the 
Committee must report its findings and recommendations to the President for final action. 
[d. The President must announce his or her decision within fifteen days of the investi-
1990] BARRIERS TO FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 191 
Another section of OTCA helps define national security.201 
Section 1501 requires the Secretary of Commerce to determine 
when certain imports affect national security.202 Under this pro-
vision, the Secretary of Commerce must notify the Department 
of Defense (DOD) of any import review.203 The Secretary must 
consult the DOD as to U.S. defense requirements throughout the 
course of review.204 The Secretary must also consult other "ap-
propriate officers" of the United States and hold hearings for 
interested parties to present their information and advice.205 The 
section does not mention what other information would be rele-
vant to the Secretary's national security review. Although Con-
gress seems to have been primarily concerned with national de-
fense, it did not limit the Secretary's review to only military 
concerns. Indeed, the door is left open for other concerns to be 
included within the realm of national security.206 The Secretary 
must report his or her findings to the President, who makes the 
final decision as to whether the import affects national security.207 
Much of OTCA's legislative history discusses a notion of na-
tional security that is broader than the DPA's concept of national 
defense.208 However, the conference committee report for OTCA 
cautions against inferring that national security is meant to imply 
any limitation on the meaning of "national defense."209 This 
seems odd because OTCA's language implies that national secu-
rity is a broader concept than national defense. The conferees 
noted that the term "national defense has been correctly inter-
preted in the past to include the provision of a broad range of 
goods and services, as well as technological innovations and eco-
nomic stabilization efforts."210 This definition seems broad 
enough to include almost any economic interest of the nation.211 
gation's completion, [d. at 800.60 I. Pursuant to section 721, the President may order 
divestment or other appropriate relief to protect national security. [d. Though these 
Regulations, proposed on July 14, 1989, are not yet law, a foreign investor would be well 
advised to consider them when planning an investment strategy in the United States. 
201 OTCA, supra note 64, at § 1501. 
202 [d. at § 1501(b)(l)(A). 
203 [d. at § 1501(b)(l)(B). 
204 [d. at § 150 I (b)(2)(A)(i). 
205 !d. at § 150 I (b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 
206 [d. 
207 [d. at § 1501(b)(3)(A). 
208 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 200, at 927. 
209 [d. at 926. 
210 [d. at 927. 
211 [d. at 926. 
192 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XIII, No. I 
The Senate Finance Committee, chaired by Senator Lloyd Ben-
tsen (D. Tex.), held hearings on national security and its place in 
OTCA. At the hearing, Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldrige 
testified that the V nited States' understanding of national security 
has traditionally centered on the ability of V.S. industries to meet 
mobilization requirements for global conventional conftict.212 He 
then argued that the traditional view of national security should 
be broadened.213 He named three areas which he believed are 
components of economic national security: 1) technologically stra-
tegic industries, 2) energy security, and 3) industrial capacity to 
mobilize.214 Though these areas may be broader than the tradi-
tional concept of mobilization, they still focus on preserving the 
self-sufficiency of the V.S. military industrial complex.215 
The Senate Committee members indicated a broader view of 
national security than the one proposed by Mr. Baldrige.216 Chair-
man Bentsen linked the national transfer of wealth (i.e., FDI) to 
national security.217 His definition of national security encom-
passed far more than defense oriented industries. Senate Majority 
Leader Robert Byrd also had a broader definition of national 
security than Secretary Baldrige.218 Senator Byrd's list of impor-
tant national security industries, however, may be somewhat 
biased since his list covers industries located in his constituent 
state of West Virginia.219 Senator Byrd actually implied that the 
trade deficit itself is a threat to national security.220 Byrd viewed 
the trade deficit as the cause of the increased V.S. national debt. 
212 Finance Committee Hearings, supra note 14, at 87 (statement by Secretary Malcolm 
Baldrige). 
213 "National security is comprised of both economic and military security .... You can 
not have one without the other .... We must consider impacts on the defense industrial 
base, [as well as] ... national security implications of foreign investment in the United 
States, ... and the importance of a reliable supply of raw materials." [d. (emphasis added). 
214 [d. at 92. 
215 [d. "Our nation's defense edge is based on technological strength rather than nu-
merical supremacy." [d. at 78. 
216 [d. at 83. 
217 "I agree that the military defenses of our country are for naught if you don't have 
a sound economy. And I'm seeing here an incredible transfer of the wealth of our country. 
And in addition to that, I think an increased vulnerability on national security." [d. at 83. 
218 [d. at 35. 
219 [d. (statement by Senator Robert Byrd) "If any industries can be denominated as 
industries that are very important to national security, certainly the steel industry, the 
coal industry, the glass, the ferro alloys, the plastics, the chemicals industries-all of these 
are found in West Virginia, or once did, and they are hurting." [d. 
220 [d. at 24. 
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This debt, he argued, will make it more difficult to pay for 
national defense. 221 Thus, any import threatening U.S. business 
becomes a threat to national security. 
Despite the vague statutory language and the ambivalent state-
ments throughout the legislative history, it appears that national 
security is limited to national defense and its related industries. 
Even Senator Byrd's industry list has some relationship to the 
requirements of maintaining a self-sufficient military industrial 
complex which can ensure a powerful and superior military force 
throughout the world. OTCA can not fill the role of a protec-
tionist statute.222 
B. Canada: The Investment Canada Act 
The ICA repealed FIRA in 1985 and eliminated 90 percent of 
foreign acquisitions and new businesses in Canada from the re-
view requirement. 223 Indeed, 75 percent of the new Investment 
Canada Agency is devoted to the development of investment 
opportunities and only 25 percent to the review of "significant" 
non-Canadian investment in Canada. 224 
FDI does not trigger review under the ICA unless the investor 
is a "non-Canadian."225 A "non-Canadian" is defined as someone 
who is 1) not a Canadian citizen, 2) not a permanent resident 
alien, 3) a foreign government, or 4) an entity where one non-
Canadian or two or more members of a non-Canadian voting 
group own a majority of the voting interests of an entity.226 The 
ICA removes from review all resident alien purchases.227 
The ICA only reviews "significant" FDI by non-Canadians. 228 
This is an element not included in OTCA, but it will soon be 
221Id. 
222Id. at 57. National security "has never been intended to be a guise for protectionism." 
(statement by Senator Charles Grassley). 
223 Cote, Canada's New Legislation on Foreign Investment, INT'L Bus. LAW., June 5, 1985, 
at 279. 
224 Grover, The Investment Canada Act, 10 CANADIAN Bus. L.J. 475 (1985). 
225 lCA, supra note 92, at § 14(1). This is different from the old FlRA "non-eligible 
person" standard. See FIRA, supra note 80, at § 3(1)(a)-(c), § 3(2). 
226 ICA, supra note 92, at §§ 3, 26(b), 26(d). This standard queried vaguely as to whether 
a corporation was controlled "in fact" by a "non-Canadian." See FIRA, supra note 80, at 
§ 3; lCA, supra note 92, at § 3. 
227 FIRA exempted only "landed immigrants" from review. See FIRA, supra note 80, at 
§ 3; ICA, supra note 92, at § 3. 
228 ICA, supra note 92, at § 2. See also Grover, supra note 224, at 478. 
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incorporated into Australia's FTA.229 An investment is "signifi-
cant" when a non-Canadian gains control of a Canadian business 
worth $5,000,000 or more. 230 An investment to acquire control 
of a Canadian business through the purchase of its non-Canadian 
parent company is reviewable if the assets of the parent company 
are worth $50,000,000 or more. 23 ! If, however, the Canadian 
subsidiary's assets comprise more than 50 percent of the parent's 
assets, the review threshold remains at the lower level of 
$5,000,000. 232 Lastly, any new business or acquisition which falls 
within a specific type of business activity that is "related to Can-
ada's cultural heritage or national identity" is significant and re-
viewable under the ICA.233 
The ICA uses a "net benefits" test as a threshold to deny any 
application for FDJ.234 Canadian law requires that FDI proposals 
present a "net benefit" to Canada. 235 The factors used to deter-
mine such benefits are very similar to those stated in the prior 
FIRA statute.236 As in FIRA, the ICA seeks to review FDI's effect 
on the level and nature of economic activity in Canada.237 The 
ICA considers FDI's effect on efficiency, productivity, and degree 
229 See infra note 264, at 54. 
230 lCA, supra note 92, at § 14(3). 
231 lCA, supra note 92, at §§ 14(l)(d), 14(4), 28(d)(ii). 
232 lCA, supra note 92, at §§ 14,28. See also Grover, supra note 224, at 478. 
233 lCA, supra note 92, at 15(a). 
234 lCA, supra note 92, at § 23(3)(a)-(b). See also Grover, supra note 224, at 479-480. 
235 lCA, supra note 92, at § 20. See also lCA § 23(3)(a)-(b). 
236 lCA, supra note 92, at § 20. 
The current lCA review factors are as follows: 
(a) The effect of the investment on the level and nature of economic activity 
in Canada, including, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, the effect 
on employment, on resource processing, on the utilization of parts, components 
and services produced in Canada and on exports from Canada; 
(b) the degree and significance of participation by Canadians in the Canadian 
business or new Canadian business and in any industry or industries in Canada 
of which the Canadian business or new Canadian business forms or would form 
a part; 
(c) the effect of the investment on productivity, industrial efficiency, techno-
logical development, product innovation and product variety in Canada; 
(d) the effect of the investment on competition within any industry or industries 
in Canada; 
(e) the compatibility of the investment with national industrial, economic and 
cultural policies, taking into consideration industrial, economic and cultural pol-
icy objectives enunciated by the government or legislature of any province likely 
to be significantly affected by the investment; and 
(f) the contribution of the investment to Canada's ability to compete in world 
markets. 
lCA § 20. 
237 lCA, supra note 92, at § 20. 
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of competition in the Canadian economy.238 It also reviews the 
effect of FDI on Canadian participation in management deci-
sions.239 Most importantly, the ICA, like FIRA, reviews a pro-
posed FDI's compatibility with national economic policies as 
stated by the Canadian government.240 The ICA factors include 
consideration of national "cultural goals" as stated by the govern-
ment. 241 This is an addition to the FIRA factors and the only 
material difference between the enunciated factors in the respec-
tive statutes. 242 
The Investment Canada Act does not seek to regulate foreign 
purchases of land. Such transactions are reviewable if they involve 
the acquisition of a Canadian business which satisfies the 
$5,000,000 review threshold.243 Real estate may also be subject to 
review if it is imbued with some Canadian culturallegacy.244 This 
policy ensures Canadian control over the symbols of its history 
and heritage. Section 10(l)(k) of the ICA provides an exemption 
for foreign real property purchases where there is "an acquisition 
of control of a Canadian business, the revenue of which is gen-
erated from farming carried out on real property acquired in the 
same transaction. "245 
C. Australia: The Foreign Takeovers Act 
In 1975, Australia responded to increasing foreign control by 
passing the Foreign Takeovers Act (FTA).246 The FTA followed 
from the measures initially introduced in the early 1970s. The 
FTA gave the Treasurer, through the new Foreign Investment 
Review Board (FIRB), the power to review certain foreign ac-






243 Investments are only reviewable if they seek to acquire or establish a Canadian 
business. ICA, supra note 92, at § 14. Under the ICA, an acquisition of all or substantially 
all the assets of a business, including real property, constitutes an acquisition of such 
business. ICA § 28(1)(c). 
244 ICA, supra note 92, at § IS. 
245 ICA, supra note 92, at § 10(1 )(k). 
246 See supra note 102. 
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est."247 The government can prohibit investments that offend the 
"national interest. "248 
The Australian "national interest" approach may technically 
seem to be less restrictive on foreign investment than the Cana-
dian "net benefits" test. While under the lCA a proposed foreign 
investment must demonstrate a net positive effect on the local 
economy, the test under the Australian FT A requires only that 
proposed investment from abroad must not cause a negative 
effect on the local economy.249 Thus, the presumption in the 
respective review schemes seems opposite. However, this legal 
nuance does not seem to have significantly affected the operation 
oflaw.250 Canada's lCA has actually been more liberal in allowing 
foreign investment under its stricter presumption than Australia 
under its looser presumption.251 
Although not defined by statute, the Treasurer has interpreted 
"national interest" as requiring a balancing test. 252 The FlRB 
attempts to maximize the benefits of foreign direct investment 
while minimizing any disadvantages.253 
The FlRB considers two elements in its FDl review.254 These 
elements are similar to those states in the Canadian lCA.255 First, 
the FlRB looks to the projected net economic benefits of the 
FDl.256 The FlRB analyzes whether the proposed investment will 
increase competition, raise price levels, improve efficiency, intro-
duce new technology and management skills, improve the struc-
ture of the economy, or develop new export markets.257 Next, 
the FlRB seeks to determine whether the business will be in 
Australia's best interests. 258 Australians want to know whether the 
FDI will be consistent with their national goals. The FIRB con-
siders how FDl will affect defense policy, national economic pol-
247 FTA, supra note 102, at §§ 18-29. 
248ld. at § 21(2)(c). 
249 See supra notes 247-248. 
250 See infra notes 320, 335. 
251 ld. 
252 Flint, supra note 103, at 626. 
253 ld. 
254 ld. 
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icy, tax policy, and whether Australians will secure high level 
decision making positions in the proposed company.259 
The threshold for review of existing business begins when a 
foreign person acquires 15 percent or more of the voting power 
in a corporation.260 This is defined as holding interests in at least 
15 percent of the issued shares of the corporation. 261 In addition, 
a proposed takeover is reviewable if two or more persons are in 
a position to control 40 percent or more of the voting power or 
40 percent of the issued shares of the corporation. 262 The FIRB 
may prohibit proposed FDI if it believes that 1) the business's 
control is at stake, 2) control will fall into the hands of a foreigner, 
and 3) such control would be against the national interest.263 
The Australian government liberalized some of its foreign in-
vestment review policies in the mid 1980s.264 During 1985-86, 
the government abolished the "opportunities test" in its foreign 
investment review.265 The test had required a foreign investor to 
demonstrate that Australians were given an opportunity to pur-
chase any and all assets sought before the investor could purchase 
such assets.266 In addition, the changes of 1985-86 imposed a 
requirement for investment applications to show a "net benefit" 
to Australia rather than the previous "substantial benefits" re-
quirement. 267 By 1987, however, even the looser "net benefits" 
test was abandoned for investment applications in all sectors of 
the economy except banking, civil aviation, media, uranium, de-
veloped real estate, and mining.268 While the excepted industries 
(or "sensitive industries") still remain on the "net benefits" test, 
all other industries are under the even looser "national interest" 
test. 269 Applications for direct investment in the Australian econ-
omy will be generally approved unless they are "contrary to the 
national interest."270 The abrogation of the "net benefits" test is 
259 [d. 
260 FTA, supra note 102, at §§ 21(2), 8, 9(1). 
261 [d. at §§ 8, 9(1 )-(3). 
262 [d. at §§ 8, 9(1)-(3), 21. 
263 FTA § 21(2). See also Flint, supra note 103, at 622. 
264 FIRB Report, supra note 164. 





270 [d. at 3. 
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the single most liberalizing change in Australia's review policy 
since the adoption of the FT A.271 
In another liberalizing effort, the government is proposing to 
amend the FTA to limit FIRB reviews of takeovers to Australian 
companies valued at $5,000,000 or more.272 Review for new busi-
ness start-ups in manufacturing currently begins at companies 
worth $10,000,000.273 No equity requirements exist for new com-
panies.274 The increase in the review thresholds makes the Aus-
tralian FTA review similar to the Canadian "significant invest-
ment" review under the ICA.275 This liberalizing trend indicates 
that the Australian government, like Canada, is gearing its policy 
towards attracting rather than policing foreign capital.276 
Unlike the United States and Canada, Australia has singled out 
the real estate market as a national interest concern.277 The Aus-
tralian FDI policy focuses on preventing foreign speculation in 
domestic real estate investments which seek capital gain or other 
profit without accompanying benefits to Australia.278 No real es-
tate purchase may be "contrary to the national interest."279 Some 
carry further requirements such as a 50 percent Australian equity 
participation or a manifest "net benefit" to Australia.280 The spe-
cial restrictions governing foreign purchases of Australian real 
estate reflect the nationalistic attachment Australians have for 
their land as well as their fear of price increases through over-
speculation. 
In September 1987, the Australian government moved to se-
verely restrict foreign investment in real estate.281 The FIRB 
focused on developed real estate. Due to upward pressure on 
capital city housing markets, the new policy forbids all foreign 
purchases of developed residential real estate. There are three 
sets of people who are exempt from the ban: Australian citizens 
271 Id. 
272Id. (letter of April 30, 1987), at 54. 
273 Id. (letter of July 28, 1986), at 52. 
274Id. 
275 See supra notes 228-233. 
276Id. 
277 Flint, supra note 103, at 625. 
278 Lieberman & Sternberg, Some Legal Aspects of Real Estate Investment in Australia, 2 
INT'L REAL PROP. INV. J. 27, 52 (1984). 
279 FIRB Report, supra note 164, at 2. 
28°Id. at 26-29. 
281 Cassie & O'Connor, Break for Offshore Property Investors, AUSTRALIAN FIN. REV., Nov. 
4,1987. 
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residing abroad, foreigners who intend to migrate and reside 
permanently in Australia, and foreign companies seeking to buy 
homes for their executives residing in Australia.282 
Additionally, the FIRB abolished the $600,000 review thresh-
old for foreign purchases of any urban real estate.283 Prior to 
September 29,1987, foreign purchases of urban real estate below 
the value of $600,000 were "de minimus" and not subject to 
review.284 The threshold was cumulative from 1978285 and was 
an increase from the previous $350,000 level set in 1980.286 The 
amendment subjects any and all FDI in urban real estate to the 
FIRB review.287 
The FIRB encourages "productive" investment in real estate. 
Acquisitions of real estate for development are approved without 
the need for Australian equity participation provided that they 
are not "contrary to the national interest."288 Such investment 
brings the benefits of increased housing stock or business space 
without any harm to Australia.289 Presumably, these properties 
are either resold to Australians or used by Australians in a pro-
ductive capacity. Thus, no restrictions burden foreign invest-
ments that lack the evils of speculation and loss of Australian 
control. 
The FIRB currently requires 50 percent Australian equity par-
ticipation in purchases of developed nonresidential commercial 
real estate.290 Australian policymakers consider purchases of de-
veloped real estate to be unproductive investments that present 
no benefits to Australia and may possibly bring harm by increas-
ing real estate prices. 291 Where the 50 percent Australian equity 
is unavailable, however, 100 percent foreign ownership is per-
mitted provided that foreign ownership is not "contrary to the 
national interest. "292 
282 The Han. P.]. Keating MP, "Foreign Investment Policy: Developed Residential Real 




286 Lieberman & Sternberg, supra note 278, at 52. 
287 Press Release, supra note 282. 
288 FIRB Report, supra note 164, at 26. See also Press Release, supra note 282. 
289 Press Release, supra note 282. 
290 FIRB Report, supra note 164, at 26. See also Australian Overseas Information Service, 
Foreign Investment In Australia, No.7 July, FACT SHEET (1988) [hereinafter FACT SHEET]. 
291 Press Release, supra note 282. 
292 FIRB Report, supra note 164, at 26. 
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In 1986 and 1987, the Australian government liberalized its 
rules related to rural land.293 Undeveloped rural land is not sub-
ject to review until the cumulative purchases of a particular for-
eign investor equal $3,000,000.294 The FIRB requires 50 percent 
Australian equity participation in any foreign investment scheme 
in rural property.295 If, however, such equity is unavailable, 100 
percent foreign ownership will be allowed if it presents a "net 
benefit" to Australia.296 
Australia has targeted some industries as "restricted policy sec-
tors," which subjects foreign investment in these areas to stricter 
review.297 These industries include banking, insurance, finance, 
communications media, mining, civil aviation, and uranium.29B 
Each area has its own separate equity requirements and review 
thresholds.299 In aviation and media, however, investments are 
subject to a vague case-by-case assessment.300 Investments in any 
of the restricted policy areas must at least present a "net benefit" 
to Australia.301 While the government has begun to liberalize 
some of the restrictions in these areas, investment barriers remain 
as a policy tool for the preservation of Australia's culture and 
retention of local control over its vital industries. 
V. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT REVIEW 
POLICIES 
The U.S. Congress' desire to broaden the definition of national 
security, manifest throughout the legislative history, reveals some 
"protectionist" or "economic nationalist" motives. It is an attempt 
to start government reviews of foreign investment before national 
security is actually implicated. For example, the House originally 
sought to require registration of significant FDI and foreign port-
folio investments.302 The House also sought additional informa-
293 [d. at 29. 
294 [d. 
295 [d. 
296 !d. For a more detailed description of the Treasury's new policy regarding foreign 
investment in urban real estate pursuant to its announcement on September 29, 1987, 
see Foreign Investment Review Board Report 1987-1988, Attachment C, 28-30. 
297 FIRB Report, supra note 164, at 2. 
298 [d. 
299 [d. at 2-4. 
300 FACT SHEET, supra note 290. 
301 FIRB Report, supra note 164, at 2-4. 
302 CONFERENCE 'REPORT, supra note 200, at 927-928. 
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tion regarding the identity of foreign investors seeking control-
ling interests in U.S. corporations as well as the financial and 
corporate records of those U.S. companies sought to be ac-
quired.303 Though these initiatives were rejected by the Senate, 
they clearly display the protectionist sentiment brewing in Con-
gress. 
The U.S. national security threshold is confusing and nar-
roW.304 Instead of manipulating the meaning of national security 
and possibly confusing the law, Congress could have expressly 
adopted what it evidently desired. The President would then have 
the authority to review foreign direct investments for their eco-
nomic, political, and cultural impacts as well as for national se-
curity concerns. Instead, the national security criterion limits the 
President to concerns of military preparedness and arms pro-
duction.305 Unlike the Investment Canada Agency or the FIRB, 
the President under OTCA may not review a proposed foreign 
investment's economic effects such as rent fluctuations, price 
changes, job dislocations, interest rate patterns, or market con-
centration.306 The President has no authority under OTCA to 
review the foreign investment's effect on the decisionmaking role 
of resident nationals in contrast to the ICA and the FTA.307 
OTCA also lacks any provision that authorizes the President to 
consider any cultural effects of proposed foreign investment,308 
whereas both the ICA and the FTA provide protection for "cul-
tural industries"309 or "restricted policy sectors."310 Because the 
national economy affects many important U.S. interests beyond 
the nation's need to defend itself, the President ought to have 
the authority to assert those interests when reviewing FDI. 
OTCA provides a low threshold for review. 311 It calls for review 
of all FDI into existing U.S. companies that are engaged in in-
terstate commerce.312 Since interstate commerce is a very elastic 
term, OTCA allows for review of even insignificant purchases.313 
303 [d. at 928. 
304 See supra notes 192-222. 




309 See infra note 320. 
310 See supra note 297. 
3ll See supra notes 179-222. 
312 [d. 
313 [d. 
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Thus, the President theoretically must review practically all FDls 
to determine if the national security is threatened. 
Such an ill-defined and burdensome standard seems unneces-
sary. Canada's review process begins only when a "significant" 
investment is proposed.314 Australia is currently amending its 
review scheme to mirror Canada's "significant investment" 
threshold.315 OTCA could similarly be more artfully drafted to 
provide for a more efficient review system. 
Ironically, the review threshold is also somewhat narrow. 
OTCA does not provide for review of any new business estab-
lished by foreigners. 316 Both Canada and Australia consider the 
significance of such investment in their foreign investment review 
policies. 317 OTCA also fails to mention purchases of either urban 
or rural real estate.318 Because there are valid national economic 
interests that are affected by FDI in these areas, such a review 
would be beneficial to the United States. 
The Canadian approach provides a balanced review of FDI. A 
nation has an interest in preserving its culture and autonomy 
while simultaneously enjoying the benefits of outside infusions of 
capital. The ICA reflects first-hand experience of how excessive 
review of FDI can hurt a local economy.319 Current Canadian 
investment policy strikes a feasible balance between nationalism 
and foreign financed growth. 
No investment has yet been turned down under the ICA.320 
FDI increased from $3.8 billion in 1984 to $6.7 billion in 1986.321 
Conservatives in Canada maintain that nationalistic controls de-
value Canadian companies and increase corporate concentration 
by limiting the number of potential buyers. 322 The Mulroney 
government finds it difficult to see how great concentrations of 
power in the hands of a small number of large Canadian corpo-
rations will benefit the average Canadian. 323 
314 See supra note 228. 
315 See supra notes 272-274. 
316 See supra notes 179-222. 
317 See supra notes 228 and 273. 
318 See supra notes 179-222. 
319Id. 
320 America's Half Open Back Door, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 17, 1987, at 66 [hereinafter 
Half Open Door]. 
321 Jenish, The New Debate About Takeovers, MACLEANS, May 4, 1987, at 38. 
322 Id. 
323 Id. 
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Canadians, however, still jealously protect certain "cultural in-
dustries."324 One difference between ICA's "net benefit" factors 
and FIRA's "significant benefit" factors is the ICA's addition of 
cultural policy concerns.325 These protected industries include 
film production, book publishing, and newspapers.326 The Ca-
nadian government also wants to achieve 50 percent Canadian 
ownership of the energy industry.327 The ICA displays a lingering 
distrust of foreign money despite the liberalizing trend. 
Canada's current FDI review policy is a better balanced ap-
proach than the policies stated in FIRA and OTCA. The ICA 
encourages FDI in those sectors of the Canadian economy where 
the legislature has deemed such investment to be appropriate.328 
The ICA also clearly states governmental policy on certain in-
dustries and thereby notifies foreign investors of any possible 
problems.329 Lastly, the ICA satisfies the public's desire for do-
mestic control over those industries which serve to represent, 
depict, preserve, and develop Canadian culture.330 In contrast, 
while OTCA's national security criterion is difficult to define and 
focuses too narrowly on only one important national interest, 
FIRA proved to be overly burdensome. 
Australia is following Canada's liberal trend in its foreign in-
vestment review policy largely in an attempt to pull itself out of 
economic stagnation.331 Throughout the 1980s, Australia was in 
recession with high interest rates and a huge international debt 
burden.332 The debt and the erratic currency were major factors 
discouraging foreign investors. In addition, the Australian pop-
ulation of 16 million is not a large enough customer base to attract 
firms when severe legal hurdles exist. Infusions of foreign capital 
and foreign management have been regarded as a means for 
economIC recovery. 
In response, Australia has begun to lower its barriers on FDJ.333 
Foreign investment doubled in 1987 from the previous year as a 
324 Half Open Door, supra note 320, at 66. 
325 Compare FIRA, supra note 80, at § 2(2) with ICA, supra note 92, at § 20. 
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result of the liberalization policy.334 Only one FDI proposal was 
rejected because it was "contrary to the national interest."335 
Though the rules have been loosened, they are well tailored to 
address the specific evils Australians want eradicated.336 Specific 
industries are protected, and only certain deleterious real estate 
investments are barred.337 Australia has encouraged FDI where 
there are no perceived side effects that could weaken its small 
struggling economy. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Barriers to foreign direct investment are as old as the legal 
system. Originally, feudal kings required oaths of fealty before a 
person could own or manage land. Nations still view land as a 
special asset affecting the food supply and touching nationalistic 
emotions. 
As the global economy became more complex, nations began 
to identify with their manufacturing capacity and research ability. 
Some distrust of foreign money is well founded as countries have 
become subjugated to the will of another through the power of 
investment. Yet, there are undeniable benefits to foreign capital 
inflows. Foreign investment, if monitored and used properly by 
the host country, can provide economic growth, new technology, 
and prosperity. 
The United States currently reviews FDI only for national se-
curity concerns. The FDI review provision in OTCA does not 
protect the United States from the risk of dependency, resent-
ment, and malaise that foreign money may bring.338 
Canadian leaders have learned through experience that foreign 
values and control are attached to foreign direct investment. 339 
With this understanding they review the economic and cultural 
effects of significant FDI before permitting its entry.340 Moreover, 
the Canadian review system has spurred economic growth. Their 
system has allowed a 100 percent increase in FDI over the last 
five years. 
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Australia's FDI controls have also been liberalized in an effort 
to stimulate economic growth.34 ! Its government has begun loos-
ening regulations in banking, real estate, and manufacturing sec-
tors, and has generally relaxed the benefit requirements for in-
vestment applications.342 Still, Australia has preserved strict 
controls where foreign money is thought to be "contrary to the 
national interest."343 Though many controls are gone, distrust of 
outsiders remains. 
U.S. leaders must take a broad, pragmatic view of FDI and 
understand its far reaching effects, both positive and negative. 
Although U.S. policy should protect national heritage as well as 
national security, the United States must be careful not to fall 
into economic isolationism. Overrestriction will yield few benefits. 
The United States should use the Canadian example of using 
FDI for its own interests. Foreign investment need not lead to 
foreign domination. 
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